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Abstract. Major crises can act as critical junctures or reinforce the political status quo, depending on how citizens
view the performance of central institutions. We use an interrupted time series to study the political effect of the
enforcement of a strict confinement policy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, we take advantage
of a unique representative web-based survey that was fielded in March and April 2020 in Western Europe to compare
the political support of those who took the survey right before and right after the start of the lockdown in their
country. We find that lockdowns have increased vote intentions for the party of the Prime Minister/President, trust
in government and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, we find that, while rallying individuals around current
leaders and institutions, they have had no effect on traditional left–right attitudes.
Keywords: COVID-19; democracy; public opinion
Introduction
The 2020 coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic poses an unprecedented challenge to
established democracies. Governments face an apparent trade-off between a large number of deaths
and an economic shutdown. In response, most countries have enforced strict social confinement
measures unthinkable outside war times, and usually referred to as ‘lockdowns’. Although there
seems to be a consensus that such policies are the most effective means to reduce the incidence of
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which causes COVID-19, they
also strongly reduce civil liberties, erode social capital and bring about economic insecurity (Fetzer
et al. 2020). Hence, whether and how lockdowns affect political attitudes is far from being trivial.
As emphasised by Stephens (2020) in the Financial Times, we observe, amid the
COVID-19 pandemic, ‘the return of government to centre stage [that] marks the close of an era in
which power and responsibility migrated from states to markets’. In this new era, a key question
emerges: when confronted with grave threats such as those caused by a major health crisis, do
citizens trust the democratic system to respond? To answer this question, we study the short-
term effects of lockdowns on political attitudes in the context of Western European democracies.
In particular, we investigate public support for decision makers, institutions and regimes. Such
support, specifically directed towards political actors and more diffuse towards the political system,
is key for the good functioning of democracy (Easton 1975; Claassen 2020).
Major international crises can act as critical junctures or reinforce the status quo depending
on how well-established institutions perform, and how citizen perceive this performance. In this
paper, we aim to speak to the literature on policy feedback that explores the loop from policies to
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mass attitudes, and to policies again (for a review, see Campbell 2012), by focusing on the effect
of the main policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic, that is, lockdowns. This literature has
shown that the policies adopted in response to a major crisis can affect political support. First,
they can rally citizens around the Head of the State when these citizens perceive that the policies
indeed help solve the issue or at least bring some relief (e.g., Bechtel & Hainmueller 2011; Healy
& Malhotra 2009). This mechanism of retrospective performance evaluation leads to accountable
governments. Second, they can alter support for institutions by shifting citizens’ views about these
institutions, which can in turn lead to regime change (e.g., Aidt & Leon 2016; Ruiz-Rufino &
Alonso 2017).
Unsurprisingly, there is so far no consensus in the literature about the political consequences of
the COVID-19 crisis. In a recent working paper, Leininger and Shaub (2020) exploit variations
in the number of confirmed cases at the county level in Bavaria and show that the health
crisis has benefited the dominant party. In a series of survey experiments and analysis of social
media data in Canada, Merkley et al. (2020) find that the pandemic has been associated with
greater partisan consensus and support for the government (see also Harell 2020). These studies
suggest that the COVID-19 crisis has been reinforcing the democratic status quo. Yet, in a working
paper that focuses on Spain, Amat et al. (2020) combine several pieces of experimental evidence
to show that it has induced a strong national bias coupled with higher demands for techno-
authoritarian decision making. These results suggest that the crisis may mark the beginning of
a paradigmatic shift in terms of democratic attitudes. In another working paper focusing on the
United States, Gadarian et al. (2020) analyse responses to a unique survey experiment and find
that support for strict confinement measures is strongly rooted in partisanship. Similarly, Grossman
et al. (2020) analyse social media data and show that the partisan affiliation of the Governor who
announced local lockdowns is also key to explaining public compliance to these lockdowns. We
seek to contribute to this emerging literature by focusing on how lockdowns have affected political
support across Western European countries in the days that followed their enforcement.
Using data from a unique online survey fortuitously fielded throughout the months of March
and April 2020 on representative samples of the population of 15 Western European countries, a
period in which seven countries started a national lockdown, we compare the political attitudes of
respondents who filled in the questionnaire right before the enforcement date and those who did
right after.1 We find that lockdowns have increased support for the status quo decision makers,
institutions and regimes. The vote intentions for the party of the Prime Minister/President have
gone up by about 4 per cent, and trust in government and satisfaction with democracy by about
3 per cent on the response’s scale.2 However, consistently with the study of Gadarian et al. (2020),
we find that lockdowns have had no effect on self-reported ideology. Furthermore, there is little
evidence of a rally-around-the-flag effect (Hetherington & Nelson 2003; Mueller 1970) that would
be entirely driven by the pandemic itself and its incidence. Overall, our study thus confirms the
retrospective evaluation of performance mechanisms: it seems that citizens have understood that
lockdowns were necessary and rewarded those responsible for them.
Data and treatment variable
Our main dataset comes from a web-based survey that took about 15 minutes to complete.3 The
questionnaire included questions about political attitudes and preferences for electoral outcomes.
It was fielded between March 2 and April 3 in 15 Western European countries (i.e., 15 members
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of the European Union prior the 2004 enlargement except Luxembourg, but with the addition
of Norway), seven of which started a lockdown during the temporal interval of the survey. The
dataset can thus be seen as an interrupted time series. To identify the confinement measures, as
well as their enforcement dates, we rely on the data gathered by Hale et al. (2020).4 In this dataset,
lockdowns are defined as nationwide and strictly enforced social confinement, that is, citizens are
forced (not simply encouraged) to stay home unless they have a valid reason to travel. According
to this definition, a lockdown was enforced in Austria (March 16), Denmark (March 18), France
(March 17), Italy (March 13), the Netherlands (March 24), Spain (March 15) and the United
Kingdom (March 23). In the main analysis, we only include these seven countries. To reduce
noise in the estimates, we do not include countries in which the containment policy was decided
at the subnational level like Germany. Yet, in a robustness test, we include the other countries, and
find that the results are essentially similar (see Appendix A.2 in the Supporting Information).
From March 2 onwards, we contracted the survey firm DyNata to contact a sample of 1,000
adults representative of the population of each country in terms of age, gender and education
attainment. In such a survey, not all respondents fill in the questionnaire on the same day. The
reason has to do with the way survey firms operate. They usually have a large database with the
email addresses of potential respondents together with some sociodemographic information about
them. On Day 1, they send an email with a link to the survey to a first set of potential respondents
and make sure that their sociodemographic distributions match the one in the latest census data of
the country. Of course, not everybody takes the survey on the same day, and some decide not to take
it at all. Then, the survey firm sends another email to a second set of potential respondents a few
days later. This operation is repeated until the sample reaches the targeted number of respondents.
In our survey, it took until April 3 to achieve this goal.5
A consequence of the survey firm’s sampling strategy is that we have in our sample respondents
who were invited to complete the survey before the lockdown enforcement date, and others who
were invited to complete it afterwards. As a consequence of this, we have respondents who
completed the survey before the lockdown, and other respondents who completed it after. This is
our treatment variable. Note that we do not assume that respondents who filled in the questionnaire
before the enforcement date did not expect a lockdown. The virus had already reached Europe at
the time, and the policy was already common in other affected countries like China. Yet, the key
difference between the ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ respondents is that only the latter witnessed the
government adopting strict confinement measures. Furthermore, Appendix A.2 in the Supporting
Information shows that, in our sample, those who responded before and after the enforcement date
are very similar on all sociodemographic variables that we can access (age, gender, education level,
rurality and immigration background). In a series of supplementary tests, we also show that they
are similar on unrelated political attitudes like ideology and political interest. Hence, although the
lockdown was expected, the probability of taking the survey before or after it seems to be ‘as good
as random’. In the rest of the paper, we thus talk about the effect of lockdowns on political support,
treating this as an effective causal identification.
Outcome variables
We focus on three key outcome variables that pertain to different aspects of political support. In
line with Easton’s (1975) classic typology, we include indicators of both specific (i.e., related to
an actor or a set of actors) and diffuse support (i.e., related to an institution or a regime). First,
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we estimate the effect of lockdowns on the probability to report, in the survey, a vote intention for
the party of the current Prime Minister (or President in the case of France). We see this variable
as an indicator of specific support. It is also in line with studies of the rally effect following a
major event like a terrorist attack (e.g., Hetherington & Nelson 2003).6 The results are similar,
although slightly larger. Second, we estimate the effect of lockdowns on variables capturing more
diffuse political support. In particular, we use the reported levels of trust in government (on a scale
from 0 to 4), and satisfaction with democracy (on a scale from 1 to 11) in the survey. Note that
the variable trust in government can be seen as either specific or diffuse support, depending on
whether the respondent understood the term ‘government’ as referring to the current composition
of the government or the institution.
We also include two extra outcome variables in the survey to run some supplementary tests:
left–right ideology (1–11) and political interest (0–3). A priori, these political attitudes should not
be affected by lockdowns, since they result from a long-term socialisation process and are quite
stable over time (Evans et al. 1996; Prior 2019). The question wording of the five outcome variables
and descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A.1 in the Supporting Information. We recode
all of them to vary between 0 and 1 to facilitate the interpretation of the results.
Results
We use OLS regressions and four specifications to estimate the effects of lockdowns on political
attitudes. They are all based on the following equation:
yi,c,t = α+ β× Lockdowni,c,t + γDeathsc,t +ψTi,c + φzi,c,t + θc + μi,c,t . (1)
Our outcome variable is yi,c,t . It refers to respondent refers to individual i in country c at time
t (=day of filling the survey). α is the intercept. Lockdown is a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if the individual was surveyed after the enforcement date in country c and 0 if it was before
it. β is the main coefficient of interest, that is, the lockdown effect. We introduce country fixed
effects θc and as an idiosyncratic error term μi,c,t . We cluster robust errors at the country-day level
to account for unobserved heterogeneity over time and space. This is the Basic specification.
We further estimate an Extended specification, in which we account for the progressing
incidence of COVID-19 spread by controlling for the number of deaths attributed to the virus as
reported in official statistics in country c at time t (γDeathsc,t ). The number of confirmed cases has
a correlation ρ = 0.95 with the number of deaths. We thus exclude it to avoid multicollinearity.
In addition, we introduce a time trend Ti,c, consisting in the number of days since the start of
the survey in March 2, to disentangle the time-varying dynamic of political support during the
pandemic from the lockdown itself.
In a third Full specification, we introduce zi,c,t, a vector of control variables, all measured in the
survey. It includes gender (0-male, 1-female), age (15–99), rurality (0-urban, 1-rural), immigration
background (0-not born in the country, 1-born in the country), education level (0-no university
degree, 1-university degree) and electoral participation (0-not voted at last election, 1-voted at last
election). The descriptive statistics of all these control variables can be found in Appendix A.1 in
the Supporting Information.
Fourth, we also estimate a Balanced specification. This specification is similar to the Full one,
except that we first use entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) to reduce any imbalance between
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Figure 1. Effect of lockdown on political support. (A): Satisfaction with democracy; (B) Trust in Government; (C)
Support for PM/ President party. Squares are OLS coefficient estimates. Horizontal bars are 95 per cent confidence
intervals.
respondents interviewed before or after the interview. Although imbalance is relatively small
(see Appendix A.1 in the Supporting Information), we can still correct for it to increase internal
validity. Concretely entropy balancing weights the distribution of covariates among non-treated
respondents to make it mimic the first and second moment of the equivalent distribution among
treated respondents.
Figure 1 presents the regression results of the four specifications.7 First, it shows that lockdowns
have increased satisfaction with democracy by 2.8–3.2 per cent and trust in government by 2.4–
3.2 per cent on the full response’s scale (from the minimum to the maximum). Second, it shows
that they have also increased vote intentions for the party of the Prime Minister/President between
4.1 per cent and 4.3 per cent. This effect reaches 6 per cent points when we consider all governing
parties (see Appendix A.2 in the Supporting Information). These short-term effects are most of the
time statistically significant at least at a level of p < 0.05. Appendix A.2 show the results for the
two extra outcomes. It points towards a non-ideological lockdown effect: the policy has affected
neither left–right ideology, nor political interest. The coefficients of interest are extremely close to
0, and never statistically significant.
We conduct a series of supplementary tests to assess the robustness of the results. They are
all described in Appendix A.2 in the Supporting Information. First, we reproduce the analysis in
adding the remaining countries covered by the original survey. Second, we remove, one-by-one,
each of the seven countries of the main analysis to make sure that the results are not solely driven
by one of them. In both instances, the results are very similar. Third, we reproduce the analysis in
changing the treatment variable by other policy responses of smaller scale to COVID-19 pandemic,
that is, school closure and workplace closure. We find a null effect.8 This test shows that among all
policies enforced in March 2020, only the most emblematic one, the lockdown, has had an effect
on political support. Fourth, we conduct a permutation test to ensure that our results are not due
to chance. For this test, we reproduce the analysis in randomly assigning a lockdown enforcement
date to one of the dates of the survey. Out of 1,000 iterations, we observe that the placebo lockdown
effect is almost always null.
Finally, we discuss the mechanism that we believe is likely to explain the positive lockdown
effect on political support. First, we consider the possibility of a rally-around-the-flag effect,
according to which it is the health crisis itself, and its incidence, that has increased political
© 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Political Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research
6 DAMIEN BOL ET AL.
support. Such an effect is common after a major crisis like a terrorist attack (Hetherington &
Nelson 2003; Mueller 1970, for some counter evidence, see Balcells & Torrats-Espinosa 2018).
Yet, if there was such an effect in data, we should observe positive coefficients associated with
the time trend variable and/or the one associated with the number of deaths. Figure 1 reveals that
there is a small positive coefficient for time (not statistically significant), and a negative one for
the number of deaths (not statistically significant). There is thus little of the existence of a rally-
around-the-flag effect in the temporal interval of the survey. Second, we consider the possibility
that the increase in political support is due to an increased airtime of the Prime Minister/President.
Indeed, the introduction of lockdowns usually went along with televised statements followed by
unusually large shares from the public. In Appendix A.2 in the Supporting Information, we report
an extra test, in which we change the independent variable to capture whether the respondents
were surveyed before or after the announcement of the lockdown by the Prime Minister/President
in the media. We find a positive effect on political support, but not a statistically significant one.
This suggests that the expectation of the policy is not enough to spur policy support. All in all,
we believe that the most likely mechanism is retrospective performance evaluation, according to
which citizens have had to understand that strict social confinement measures were necessary and
have increased their support for those responsible for this policy.
Discussion
In this research note, we analyse the responses to a survey conducted in several West European
countries in March 2020, the month in which most governments made the difficult choice to
enforce a strict containment to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Although this policy
has important negative consequences for the population, both human and economic, we find that
respondents who took the survey right after the enforcement date show higher levels of both
specific and diffuse political support than those who took it right before. First, lockdowns have
increased vote intentions for the party of the Prime Minister/President by about 4 per cent points.
Second, they increased trust in government and satisfaction with democracy by about 3 per cent on
the response’s scale. These effects are particularly interesting when considering that these two
groups of respondents are very similar in terms of sociodemographics and unrelated political
attitudes like ideology and political interest. We also find little evidence that this effect is simply
due to a rally-around-the-flag effect brought about by the health crisis itself and its incidence.
Our findings bring some good news. It seems that citizens have understood that strict social
containment was necessary, and have rewarded governments that decide to enforce it, at least in
the short term. Furthermore, our findings suggest that it has had a positive spillover effect on
support for democracy and its institutions. Perhaps, this is due to the realisation that governments
were ready to make hard decisions which have prioritised the health of vulnerable individuals over
economic interests. Whether this allows sustained action against COVID-19 virus remains to be
seen. Yet, it seems that this pandemic has maybe offered the opportunity to reconcile part of the
population with its political leaders and democratic institutions.
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Online Appendix
Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end of the
article:
Figure A.1: Distribution of responses.
Figure A.2: Permutation test.
Figure A.3: Country sensitivity analysis.
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Table A.2: Effect of lockdown on political support (full results)
Table A.3: Effect of lockdown on political support: Full sample
Table A.4: Effect of lockdown announcements on political support
Table A.5: Effect of school closing
Table A.6: Effect of workplace closing
Notes
1. Such ‘Unexpected Event during Survey Design’ (Muñoz et al. 2018) is increasingly popular in political science
and economics. It has been recently applied to study the effect of terrorist attacks (Larsen et al. 2020),
foreign electoral outcomes (Giani & Méon 2019) or even football games (Depetris-Chauvin et al. 2020) on
political attitudes.
2. When we include all governing parties as well as junior coalition partners, the effect of lockdowns on vote
intentions for parties in power reaches 6 per cent.
3. Note that the web-based nature of the survey is important here. A face-to-face survey would have been interrupted
with the enforcement of a lockdown. Our online survey continued as usual.
4. Note that in a supplementary test, we reproduce the analysis with the announcement date of the lockdowns
instead of their enforcement date. To identify the announcement date, we rely on the dataset of Cheng et al.
(2020).
5. Appendix A.1 in the Supporting Information shows the evolution of the daily number of respondents in the seven
countries included in the main analysis. It gives a visual representation of the waves in which the surveys were
sent to respondents. When we group all seven countries and look at the number of respondents relative to the
lockdown enforcement date (which varies depending on the country), we see that the distribution stretches over
the whole survey period, with a concentration around this date.
6. The governing coalitions (and Prime Minister/President) are: Austria: ÖVP (PM), Grüne; Denmark: Social
Democrats (PM); France LREM (President); Italy: M5S, PD; the Netherlands: VVD (PM), CDA, D66; Spain:
PSOE (PM), Podemos, UK: Conservatives (PM). Italy has a non-partisan Prime Minister and it is excluded
from the analysis of vote intentions for the party of the Prime Minister/President. In Appendix A.2 in the
Supporting Information, we reproduce the analysis with a variable capturing a vote intention for the parties
of the governing coalition.
7. Note that to facilitate interpretation, all continuous control variables (number of deaths, age and time trend) are
standardised, so that their mean is 0 and their standard deviation is 1.
8. Our interpretation of this null effect is that while lockdown concerns everybody, and quite unambiguously
decrease everyone’s welfare by harming social capital as well as the economy, neither school nor workplace
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closures have consequences of the same magnitude. As well as this, only full lockdowns also have a symbolic
nature: they mean reducing the freedom of movement, which is often considered as one of the most important
civil liberty.
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